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be nullified by a decision that causes the.public to, fear the consequences
of adopting a child when their efforts are at the whim and caprice of
the natural parent.
51
J. W. ALEXANDER, JR.
Bills and Notes-Reacquisition-Liability of Intermediate
Indorser to Purchaser from Reacquiring Payee
The payee of a negotiable promissory note indorsed the note to the
defendant. The defendant shortly thereafter indorsed it back to the
payee, who indorsed to the plaintiff. Plaintiff was admittedly a holder
in due course. All indorsements were special. Held: Reacquisition by
the payee gave the note a "fresh start," terminating the contractual
liability of the intermediate indorser, so that he could not be regarded
as in the line through which the holder traced his title.'
It is important that the problem of the instant case be distinguished
at the outset from that arising under §582 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law.
We are here concerned with a holder who is a holder in due course
in his own right. The specific question is: Does an indorser remain
liable to a subsequent holder in due course, in spite of reacquisition by
a prior party, when the holder took with notice of the reacquisition?
Section 58,3 on the other hand, deals with defenses available to prior
parties when the instrument is in the hands of a holder not in due
course. This section reads as follows: "In the hands of any holder
other than a holder in due course, a negotiable instrument is subject to
the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable. But a holder who de-
rives his title through a holder in due course and who is not himself a
party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument, has all the rights
of such former holder in respect of all parties prior to the latter." Thus
the specific question arising under this section is: Under what circum-
stances can a holder not in due course avoid the defenses of prior
parties ?
This distinction is necessary, for, as will be noted below, the courts
have confused the issue somewhat in discussing the instant problem, by
drawing §58 into the picture, though it is obviously inapplicable.
4
Ex parte Schultz, 181 P. 2d 585 (Nev. 1947).
1 Denniston's Adm'r v. Jackson, 304 Ky. 261, 200 S. W. 2d 477 (1947), briefly
noted in 46 MicH. L. REv. 97.IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §25-64 (quoted in text below).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §25-64.
For an extensive discussion of the problem arising under this section, see Chafee,
The Reacquisition of a. Negotiable Instrument by a Prior Party, 21 CoL L. Rxv.
538 (1921). Also see Note, 1 N. C. L. REv. 187 (1923).
, See 46 MIcE. L. Rnv. 97, 98 (1947) (brief discussion of the difference be-
tween these two problems).
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The exact problem of the principal case has arisen very few times
either under the law merchant 5 or the Negotiable Instruments Law.6
There was a split of authority under the law merchant,7 and that split
has been carried forward8 by virtue of the fact that the Negotiable
Instruments Law has no express provision covering the situation. Thus
in North Carolina Adrian v. McCaskil9 released the intermediate in-
dorser, and its doctrine was applied under the Negotiable Instruments
Law by Ray v. Livingston;'0 while in Massachusetts, West Boston
Savings Bank v. Thompson'1 held the indorser, and was approved
after adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law by State Finance
Corp. v. Pistorino.12 The one other case decided under the Negotiable
Instruments Law cited the Massachusetts cases and allowed the pur-
chaser from the reacquiring payee to hold the intermediate indorser,
only to be reversed on appeal on another ground.18
5 Howe Mach. Co. v. Hadden, 12 Fed. Cas. 710, No. 6, 785 (C. C. Ind. 1878)
(releasing the indorser) ; West Boston Savings Bank v. Thompson, 124 Mass. 506
(1878) (holding the indorser) ; Adrian v. McCaskill, 103 N. C. 182, 9 S. E. 284
(1889) (releasing the intermediate indorser) ; see Herrick v. Carman, 12 Johns.
159, 161 (N. Y. 1815) (Note the interpretation of the holding of this case in Hall
v. Newcomb, 7 Hill 416, 420 [N. Y. 1844].).
'Denniston's Adm'r v. Jackson, 304 Ky. 261, 200 S. W. 2d 477 (1947) ; State
Finance Corp. v. Pistorino, 245 Mass. 402, 139 N. E. 653 (1923) (holding the
indorser) ; Ray v. Livingston, 204 N. C. 1, 167 S. E. 496 (1933), 17 MiNN. L.
Rnv. 808 (releasing the indorser) ; Persky v. Bank of America Nat. Ass'n, 235
App. Div. 146, 256 N. Y. S. 572 (1932) (holding the indorser), rev'd on other
grounds, 261 N. Y. 212, 185 N. E. 77 (1933). (The decision in the Persky case,
holdirig the indorser, relied heavily on several cases in which the plaintiff pur-
chased the instrument before maturity from the party primarily liable thereon,
and was allowed to recover from a defendant who had indorsed prior to such
acquisition or reacquisition by the primary party. Rogers v. Gallagher, 49 Ill. 182
[1868] [Payee indorsed a bill to the acceptor and was held liable to a purchaser
who took from the acceptor before maturity.]; Eckert v. Cameron, 43 Pa. 120
[1862] [note reacquired by the maker and negotiated to the plaintiff]; cf. Horn v.
Nicholas, 139 Tenn. 453, 201 S. W. 756 [1918]. See also National Bank v. Lindsey,
25 Del. 83, 78 AtI. 407 [1910] [Note was indorsed to plaintiff by maker after
hidorsing to and reacquiring from the defendant. Recovery was allowed.]; see
Peltierv. McFerson, 67 Colo. 505, 507, 186 Pac. 524, 525 [1920]; Chicago Title
& Trust Co. v. Bidderman, 275 Ill. App. 457, 468-73 [1934]. See Note L. R. A.
1918 E 170 [and the cases cited therein] for an extensive discussion of this prob-
lem. It is submitted by the writer that the analogy between the problem of these
cases and that of the principal case is certainly well drawn. It should be noted
that the Kentucky court, in Denniston's Adn'r v. Jackson, referred to its being
influenced by the Kentucky position, "differing from the majority," that "when a
maker of a note acquires it by assignment or endorsement, the obligation is ex-
tinguished and cannot be revived." Conley v. Louisa Nat. Bfink, 296 Ky. 797, 178
S. W. 17 [1943]; Long v. Bank of Cynthiana, 11 Ky. 290 [1822]. The court
recognized, of course, the fact that these cases did not preclude its holding the
intermediate indorser.).
See note 5 supra.
s See note 6 supra.
p103 N. C. 182, 9 S. E. 284 (1889).
10204 N. C. 1, 167 S. E. 496 (1933).
11124 Mass. 506 (1878).
12245 Mass. 402, 139 N. E. 653 (1923).
1 Persky v. Bank of America Nat. Ass'n, 235 App. Div. 146, 256 N. Y. S. 572
(1932), rev'd on other grounds, 261 N. Y. 212, 185 N. E. 77 (1933).
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That was the situation at the time the Kentucky court approached the
problem, in the instant case, and in reaching its conclusion the court
relied largely on the two North Carolina cases. Therefore a critical
comment on the decision in Denniston's Adm'r v. Jackson14 necessitates
an analysis of Adrian v. McCaskill, and its life-giver under the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, Ray v. Livingston.
In the Adrian case the plaintiff purchased the note in question, after
maturity, from the payee. At the time it bore two blank indorsements-
that of the payee followed by that of the defendant. Plaintiff knew
nothing of any prior transaction between the payee and the defendant.
In affirming a judgment rendered for the defendant, the court noted
the law merchant rule15 which prevented a reacquiring party from hold-
ing liable a subsequent indorser to whom he would in turn be liable.
With no reference to the origin of this rule, and without citing any
authority, the court read in the following extension:16 "It must be
equally clear that one who derives possession from him, with notice of
the fact,. cannot hold such intermediate indorsers liable. .. ." The
court stated that the indorsements were sufficient to charge the plaintiff
with notice of the reacquisition.
Forty-four years later, after the adoption of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, the North Carolina court approved the rule of the Adrian
case and applied it in Ray v. Livingston. The plaintiff was a holder in
due course. The note bore only two genuine signatures-the indorse-
ment of the payee followed by that of the defendant. The signatures
of three co-makers and four additional blank indorsements were forged.
The circumstances under which the defendant had indorsed did not
appear, but the note was purchased by the plaintiff from the payee, and
the court assumed a negotiation by the payee to the defendant and a
renegotiation-the possession of the payee raising a presumption of
ownership. Plaintiff brought suit on the warranties for whih the de-
fendant's indorsement stood by virtue of §6617 of the Negotiable In-
14304 Ky. 261, 200 S. W. 2d 477 (1947).
Bishop v. Hayward, 4 T. R. 470, 100 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1791) (The payee of
a note was not allowed to recover from the defendant, to whom the payee had
originally indorsed. The court admitted that there might have been circumstances
under which he could have recovered, in which no circuity would be involved.
Thus the ground for so holding was circuity of action.) ; Britten v. Webb, 2 B. &
C. 483, 107 Eng. Rep. 463 (1824) (Drawer of bill to 6wn order was not allowed
to recover from the party to whom he had originally indorsed. Plaintiff sought to
make this one of the exceptions mentioned in the Bishop case, by alleging agree-
ment by defendant to indorse as security for payment by drawee, but the court
said there was no consideration for the agreement, so the case involved circuity of
action and the rule of the Bishop case applied.).
'0 Adrian v. McCaskill, 103 N. C. 182, 186, 9 S. E. 284, 285 (1889).
N. C. GnN: STAT. (1943) §25-72: "Every indorser who indorses without
qualification warrants to all subsequent holders in due course (1) the matters and
things mentioned in subdivisions one, two, and three of §25-71 [genuineness, good
title, and capacity of prior parties to contract] ; and (2) that the instrument is at
19481
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
struments Law, and, in pressing his claim, relied on the language of
that. section, that "Every indorser who indorses without qualification,
warrants to all [italics supplied] subsequent holders in due course .... "
The court did not let this language trouble it however. It merely
stated that the section should be considered in connection with the other
provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law, and proceeded to muddle
the picture by injecting the problem arising under §58. The court then
quoted §5018 (in part a codification of the common law rule preventing
suit by a reacquiring party against a subsequent indorser), and con-
cluded by restating the law as announced in Adrian v. McCasldll.
Thus the court set out to reason away the efficacy of §66, and wound
up without having done so19 by reciting the codification of the rule of
the law merchant of which the Adrian case was an extension, and hold-
ing directly on the basis of that case. 20
the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting. And in addition he engages that
on due presentment it shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be, ac-
cording to itz tenor, and that if it be dishonored and the necessary proceedings on
dishonor be duly taken he will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to any
subsequent indorser -who may be compelled to pay it."
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §25-56:"Where an instrument is negotiated back
to a prior party, such party may, subject to the provisions of this chapter, reissue
and further negotiate the same. But he [italics supplied] is not entitled to enforce
payment thereof against any intervening party to whom he was personally liable."
9 "The decision is clearly wrong. The court relied on the last sentence of
section 50, but clearly overlooked tha fact that by section 66 the warranty runs to
all subsequent holders in due course." BRANNAN'S NEGOTrABLE INsTRUMENTS
LAW, 532 (6th ed., Beutel, 1938). "The court evidently overlooked the word 'all'
in this section [§66]." Id. at 814.
Professor Britton began a recital of the holding of this case: "Without ref-
erence to Sections 65 and 66. . . ." BRITTOx, BILLS AND NoTES §299 n. 2 (1943).
20 The court made no reference to the possibility of the plaintiff's having relied
on the defendant's indorsement as having been for the accommodation of the payee.
Evidently the question was not raised by the parties. In Adrian v. McCaskill,
103 N. C.. 182, 188, 9 S. E. 284, 285 (1889), the court intimated that had the
plaintiffs purchased before maturity so as to be "'bona fide holders before ma-
turity,'" they might have been able to recover from the intermediate indorser be-
cause of such reliance. It should be noted that in each of these two N. C. cases
the indorsements were in blank, and the payees, from whom the plaintiffs had
purchased, had not indorsed after the defendant. Some courts have held the in-
termediate indorser on these grounds, saying that the indorsements import accom-
modation. Mauldin v. Branch Bank, 2 Ala. 502 (1841); Palmer v. Whitney, 21
Ind. 58 (1863) (Intermediate indorsement is presumed to be for accommodation
"in absence of contrary proof." The court said the bill was indorsed by the payee
to the defendant, back to the payee, and by him indorsed to the plaintiff, but did
not say whether by special or blank indorsements.); see Howe Mach. Co. v.
Hadden, 12 Fed. Cas. 710, No. 6, 785 (C. C. Ind. 1878) (The court discussed these
cases, but did not follow them, for it was dealing with special indorsements, and,
in addition, the complaint disclosed that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the
fact that the instrument had been negotiated to the defendant by the payee.).
Note the interpretation of State Finance Corp. v. Pistorino, 245 Mass. 402, 139
N. E. 653 (1923), in 17 MINN. L. REV. 808 (as restricting the application of the
rule of the Ray case to regular indorsers, because the court remarked that the
trial court had found the defendants to be accommodation indorsers).
Thomas B. Paton, General Counsel for the American Bankers Ass'n, gave as
his opinion that when a note payable to the order of the maker is purchased by
the holder before maturity from the maker, on which appear an indorsement by
the maker, an indorsement by an individual, and another by the maker, the indi-
vidual is liable as an accommodation indorser. 1 PATON's DIGEST §2722 (1926).
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An analysis of the Denniston. case again shows no consideration of
the history of the common law rule on which §50 is based. The Ken-
tucky court gave no more adequate consideration to the effect of the
Negotiable Instruments Law on the problem at hand than did the North
Carolina court in Ray v. Livigston. In fact, only two sections were
cited, §§ 50 and 58, and it is again submitted that the latter has no ap-
plication to this particular situation.
Those two cases under the Negotiable Instruments Law which held
the intermediate indorser gave no extensive reasons for so doing, but
reached what is believed to be much the sounder conclusion.2 1 That
result is suggested by the history of the common law rule that is em-
bodied in §50. The rule was aimed solely at preventing circuity o.f
action, with no suggestion, express or implied, of a rational basis for
its extension to relieve an intermediate indorser of the liability to sub-
sequent purchasers which he assumes by virtue of his indorsement.
22
It did not extinguish this liability; it merely prevented the action by
the reacquiring party.23 The rule was based on the policy of the law
to prevent circuity of action,24 and therefore is necessarily applicable
only where it will do so. Would circuity of action be the result of
allowing a purchaser from a reacquiring payee to hold the intermediate
indorser? Emphatically no-no more so than it results from a holder's
suing the third indorser rather than the first, or the maker. Thus the
situation under discussion is not within the rationale of §50, and the
purchaser from a reacquiring party, a holder in due course, should take
free of "defenses available to prior parties among themselves," under
§57,25 unless the Negotiable Instruments Law affords some other basis
for saying that reacquisition discharges the intermediate indorser, so
that he is not a party "liable thereon."
26
Is there any such basis? As shown above, the courts have found
none, and that is fairly indicative of the answer. The writer submits
that there is none.
"- See Chafee, The Reacquisition. of a Negotiable Instrument by a Prior Party,
21 COL. L. REv. 538, 551-53 (1921) (His discussion deals with reacquisition and
reissue by a primarily liable party, favoring holding the intermediate indorser, but
he mentions that the same principle applies to reacquisition by any prior party.) ;
see BRaITON, BILLS AND NOTES §300 (1943) (He argues that even a purchaser
after maturity should be allowed to recover from an intermediate indorser.).
2 "The provisions just quoted from Sections 50 and 121 were put in, therefore,
to prevent circuity of action. The phrasing of these statutory rules unites with
the reason for the rules strongly to suggest that they were not directed against
any person other than the reacquirer." BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES, §300 (1943).
" Cases cited note 15 supra.
" Cases cited note 15 supra.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §25-63: "A holder in due course holds the instru-
ment free from any defect of title of prior parties, and free from defenses available
to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for
the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon."
2" See note 25 supra.
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Section 12127 may be disregarded, for its use of the word "paid"
strongly suggests, when considered in the light of §8828 (defining pay-
ment in due course), that it applied only to parties reacquiring after
maturity, by virtue of payment in due course, rather than to a reacqui-
-sition in the usual course of business before maturity.2 9 There remains
§120,80 which explicitly enumerates the means by which a party second-
arily liable may be discharged, and there is no mention of discharge
through reacquisition by a prior party. Its manner of expression would
-seem to indicate that it was meant to exhaust the field.81
Nor is there any reason, speaking purely on the merits of the prob-
lem, why such an indorser should be discharged82 "because of the for-
tuitous event that the instrument got back into the hands of a subse-
quent holder."3 3
Thus is should follow that an intermediate indorser is liable to a
holder in due course who purchased from a reacquiring payee, even
27N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §25-128: "When the instrument is paid by a party
secondarily liable thereon it is not discharged; but the party so paying it is re-
mitted to his former rights as regards all prior parties, and he may strike out his
own and all subsequent indorsements, and again negotiate the instrument, except
(1) where it is payable to the order of the third person and has been paid by the
drawer; and (2) where it was made or accepted for accommodation and has been
paid by the party accommodated."
28 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §25-95: "Payment is made in due course when it is
made at or after the maturity of the instrument to the holder thereof in good
faith and without notice that his title is defective."
2" See BRiToN, BILLS AND NoTEs §294 (1943). But see Chafee, rupra note 21,
at 548. The origin of the first exception of §121 also supports the above construc-
tion of that section, for it is generally recognized as having been created by Lord
Mansfield in Beck v. Robley, 1 H. Bl. 89, 126 Eng. Rep. 54 (1788) (See Chafee,
supra note 21, at 552.), in which a bill was not paid when due, and was taken up
by the drawer. Thus, as it originated, the "paid" of the exception was payment
after maturity.
'IN. C. Gix. STAT. (1943) §25-127: "A party secondarily liable on the instru-
ment is discharged (1) by any act which discharges the instrument; (2) by the
intentional cancellation of his signature by the holder; (3) by the discharge of a
prior party; (4) by a valid tender of payment made by a prior party; (5) by a
release of the principal 'debtor, unless the holder's right of recourse against the
party secondarily liable is expressly reserved; (6) by any agreement binding upon
the holder to extend the time of payment or to postpone the holder's right to en-
force the instrument, unless made with the assent of the party secondarily liable
or unless the right of recourse against such party is expressly reserved."
See BrrJToN. BIu.s AND NOTES §300 (1943).
22 It should be noted that in several of the cases the defendant originally took
the instrument for security purposes only. Denniston's Adm'r v. Jackson, 304 Ky.
261, 200 S. W. 2d 477 (1947) ; West Boston Savings Bank v. Thompson, 124 Mass.
506 (1878); Adrian v. McCaskill, 103 N. C. 182, 9 S. E. 284 (1889). Thus it
might be argued that his position differs somewhat from that of an intermediate
indorser who really purchases an instrument and sells it back to a prior party, if
the subsequent purchaser from the reacquiring party has actual knowledge of the
transaction. This goes purely to the merits however, for there is nothing in the
present law to warrant any such distinction. In the opinion of the writer, the
argument is tenuous at best, for the party who takes for security need not indorse
the instrument in order to return it to his indorser, and if he does he should be
held liable.
"BSTTON, BnILs AND NoTEs §300 (1943).
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though the holder had actual knowledge of the reacquisition. This view
is supported by that language of §66 which was so completely disre-
garded in Ray v. Livingston.
The Negotiable Instruments Law is now being revised by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute, as a part of their Commercial Code project.8 4
This problem should be dealt with explicitly so that there will be no
question but what an intermediate indorser will be held to that liability
which he assumes.35
ALFRED D. WARD
Criminal Law-North Carolina Bastardy Statute-Support
of Illegitimate Children
In State v. Stiles,' the defendant was indicted for willful failure to
support his illegitimate child. In order to secure a conviction under
this indictment, it is necessary that the State prove two elements. First,
that the defendant is the father of the illegitimate child, and second,
that his failure to support the child was willful.
2
The prosecutrix's testimony as to the conception presented sufficient
evidence on the point of paternity to support the jury's finding that
the defendant was the father of the child. Since the defendant admitted
having failed to support the child, it was only incumbent upon the prose-
cution to show that his failure to support was accompanied by a willful
intent. When the State proved that the defendant had known of the
prosecutrix's pregnant condition and her requests for "aid" even before
the birth of the child, the jury was fully justified in finding that his
subsequent failure to support the child was willful, without justification
or excuse. However, had the State failed to establish the requisite;
willful intent, the defendant would have been guilty of no crime, since
the statute makes willfullness a necessary ingredient of the offense. 8
The present statute4 under which the defendant was indicted super-
seded the old Bastardy Proceedings. Bastardy Proceedings5 were civil
" See HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 143 (1944).
" It has been learned through correspondence that the revision in its present
tentative form includes a provision discharging an intermediate indorser on re-
acquisition by a prior party. This draft is, of course, "subject to change without
notice," and the writer hopes that such will be the fate of the provision in question.
2228 N. C. 137, 44 S. E. 2d 728 (1947).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-2.
' State v. Vanderlip, 225 N. C. 610, 35 S. E. 2d 885 (1945) ; State v. Hayden,
224 N. C. 779, 32 S. E. 2d 333 (1944) ; State v. Allen, 224 N. C. 530, 31 S. E. 2d
530 (1944) ; State v. Moore, 220 N. C. 535, 11 S. E. 2d 660 (1941) ; State v.
McLamb, 214 N. C. 322, 199 S. E. 81 (1938); State v. Tarlton, 208 N. C. 734,
182 S. E. 481 (1935) ; State v. Tyson, 208 N. C. 231, 180 S. E. 85 (1935).
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-2.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §265.
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